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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
';y ARREN IRRIGATION 
COMP ANY, a corporation, 
vs. 
Appellant, 
MILTON T. BROWN and 
FLORENCE H. BROWN, his wife, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
12620 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Suit to quiet title to plaintiff's water rights and for 
a decree declaring an exchange of water rights termi-
nated or, if such relief is not granted, for a decree re-
stricting the defendants' water right, herein ref erred to 
as the "Lyman Skeen" right as to the water source, as to 
the quantity of water reasonably required to irrigate the 
defendants' land and requiring the defendants to pay 
their pro rata share of the cost of construction, operation 
1 
and maintenance of water diversion, storage and distri-
bution facilities. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court decreed that the defendants are the 
owners of the Lyman Skeen water right as described in 
a decree, hereinafter ref erred to as the "1914 decree" 
' declared that such right could be used on certain land 
owned by the defendants, determined the annual amount 
to be paid by the defendant for the water right, and 
awarded damages against the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the 
decree and the entry of a decree declaring that the Ly-
man Skeen water right was terminated by a condition 
subsequent contained in the deed exchanged for the deed 
which created the right and restoring to the parties the 
rights originally owned by their predecessors or if such 
relief is not granted, the entry of a decree declaring that 
the Lyman Skeen right is limited to the land to which it 
was originally made appurtenant, and to the quantity of 
water that can be beneficially used thereon, that it is 
limited as to the water source, and that its owners are 
obligated to pay their pro rata share of the cost of con· 
struction, operation and maintenance of irrigation fa· 
cilities. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Warren Irrigation Company, will 
be ref erred to in this brief as the "plaintiff" and the re-
spondents, Milton T. and Florence H. Brown, will be 
referred to as the "defendants." 
The plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation engaged in 
distributing water to its stockholders by means of the 
Warren Canal and other facilities. The canal formerly 
owned by the Utah Light & Power Company and Utah 
Light & Railway Company, diverts water from the 
Weber River near 12th Street, West of Ogden, and at 
points below from Four Mile and Mill Creeks. The main 
canal is 30 to 40 miles long, has a capacity of 90 second 
feet (Tr. 14), and carries water for the irrigation of land 
in and around Warren, Utah. The Skeen ditch with a 
capacity of 8 or 9 second feet, diverts water under the 
Lyman Skeen right from the Warren Canal and carries 
it to the defendants' property shown on Exhibit C. (Tr. 
15). 
The facts which relate to the creation of the Lyman 
Skeen water right are not in dispute. The right is the re-
sult of the exchange of deeds, one dated February II, 
1903, (Exhibit H) from Utah Light & Power Company 
to Lyman Skeen and the other dated February 16, 1904 
(R. 47, 48) from Lyman Skeen and wife to Utah Light 
& Railway Company (successor to Utah Light & Power 
Company) . For the convenience of the Court, a copy of 
each deed is appended hereto. (Appendix pp. 27-35). 
They will be referred to as the "1903 deed" and the 
"1904 deed." 
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The defendants, as successors of Lyman Skeen 
claim ownership of the Lyman Skeen water right, not a~ 
it is described and limited in the 1903 deed, but as it is 
described in a decree in the case of Lyman Skeen v. 
Warren Irrigation Company, dated, February 10, 1914, 
and enforced by an order of the District Court of Weber 
County, dated, February 5, 1938, in a case entitled, Ly-
man Skeen and D. A. Skeen, Plaintiff, v. Warren Irri-
gation Co., and Utah Light & Railway Company, De-
fendants, dated August 22, 1913, No. 4201 which re-
lates to conveyance rights in a canal. 
The parties construe the documents mentioned 
above and their legal effect differently, the plaintiff con-
tending that ( 1) the rights of the parties are determined 
by the 1903 and 1904 deeds, ( 2) the plaintiff has by 
denying water to the defendants, terminated the ex-
change of water rights as set out in the 1904 deed, ( 3) 
the 1914 decree and the 1938 order are not pertinent to 
the issue of termination, and ( 4) in the alternative, if the 
court should hold that the exchange is not terminated, 
by the condition subsequent in the 1904 deed, then the 
1914 decree should be construed as merely substituting 
one provision, a method of delivery of water and not 
superseding the 1903 deed as contended by the defend-
ants. The defendants on the other hand contend that the 
1914 decree entirely superseded the 1903 and 1904 deeds 
that the plaintiffs predecessor and the plaintiff have al-
ready had their day in court, that the 1914 decree and 
the 1938 order are res judicata and there are no issues 
of fact or law before the court. 
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To avoid repetition, the language of the documents 
mentioned above will not be quoted and discussed in the 
statement of facts, but only in the argument. 
The plaintiff has pleaded facts which raise equitable 
issues which must he considered only if the court holds 
that the happening of the condition subsequent did not 
terminate and restore to the parties the water rights as 
they existed prior to 1903. Evidence was offered and 
received in support thereof. 
The full flow of water under the Lyman Skeen 
right, as fixed by the 1903 deed and the 1914 decree, 
greatly exceeds the quantity of water which can he bene-
ficially used on the defendant's land. A civil engineer, 
Lew A. W angsgaard, testified that the quantity of water 
provided by the flow of water set out in the 1914 decree 
would annually total 252 acre feet and that the land 
owned by the defendants originally described in the 1903 
deed, comprised only 50.26 acres and reasonably re-
quired only 150 acre feet of water for irrigation. (Tr. 
8-10). No other expert testimony was introduced on this 
issue. It was countered by the testimony of the defend-
ant Milton T. Brown, that he needed all the water pro-
vided by the Lyman Skeen right. (Tr. 63). 
In 1922, Lyman Skeen deeded to his sons, Blaine 
and Wilford a total of 80 acres which included some 
' 
67.5 acres of the land described in the 1903 deed to which 
the Lyman Skeen water right was appurtenant. (See the 
map, Exhibit C and the deeds, Exhibit K.) The deed 
contained no reservation of the water right. The def end-
5 
ants own only 50.26 irrigable acres which were described 
in the 1903 deed. (See Exhibit C and Tr. 16-18.) 
The 1903 deed by its terms provides in paragraph 
{2) that the water to be furnished Lyman Skeen was to 
be " ... from the now e.risting rights of the Utah Light 
& Power Company in the waters of \Veber River, .Mill 
Creek and Four .l\lile." The 1914 decree limits the source 
of water ... "to natural sources of supply (exclusive of 
its pumping plant) ... " 
Testimony was given by J .. Maurice Skeen that the 
sources of water in the \Varren Canal are the Weber 
River, Four Mile Creek and Mill Creek and that in 1945 
and 1954, pumps were installed at a cost of $9,200.00, 
and in 1962, a dam was constructed in \V eber River at a 
cost of $56,527.00. In 1967, a diversion dam was con-
structed at a cost of $16,800.00. Some of the costs were 
repaid by the ASCS. About 1932, the plaintiff pur-
chased 1,500 acre feet of storage water in Echo Reser-
voir. (Tr. 27). \\Tater from all sources has gone to .Mr. 
Brown. (Tr. 27, 28). Following this testimony, an ob-
jection was made to the question as to whether there was 
any difference in the delivery of water as to the source 
of water. (Tr. 28). We quote from the record: 
MR. SKEEN: \Ve take the position under these 
documents ~Ir. Brown was entitled only to the 
water or water from the water source available 
on the date of the original indenture in 1903 and 
that he has no interest in the water that the com· 
panies purchased since or acquired by purchase, 
or otherwise. 
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MR;. CLYDE: There is no issue on that. We 
don t deny that. I mean we are entitled to the four 
and five feet exactly as that deed says, and pur-
chases they have mad_e fro:r;n Echo or improve-
ments they haye made m their pumping system to 
get other or d1ff erent waters we have no interest . 
. MR. SKEEN: If you admit you have no inter-
est, I will withdraw the question. 
MR. CLYDE: All right. (Tr. 28) 
It is alleged in paragraph 5 of the complaint that, 
"The defendants further claim the right to the benefit, 
without cost to them of all water diversion, storage and 
distribution facilities constructed at great expense to the 
plaintiff and its stockholders since February 11, 1903." 
(R. 2) The defendant.s claim that the payment of the 
sum of 30 cents per acre for 110 acres or $33.00 meets 
all of the obligations of the defendants to pay for the 
water and the cost of operation and maintenance of the 
diversion and distribution system of the Warren Irriga-
tion Company. The evidence is uncontradicted that the 
stock of plaintiff corpora ti on has been assessed annually 
from 1929 to 1970 in amounts varying from $2.00 to 
$7.00 per share to pay for the maintenance of the canal, 
the diversion dam, pumping expense, water master and 
the "total expense." (Tr. 33). The Lyman Skeen right 
is shown on the books of the irrigation company, some-
times as no shares and sometimes as no acres, but it has 
always been assessed $33.00 a year. (Tr. 32). 
The trial court found that the 1914 decree super-
seded the 1903 deed and contained no limitations as to 
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the place of use (R. 83, 84); that the water has been de-
livered to Lyman Skeen and his successors from 1914 to 
1968 and that the defendants now own 80 acres formerly 
owned by Lyman Skeen and that for at least 50 years, the 
Skeen Ditch water has been used on the 80 acres ( R. 
84). The court further found that the deeds from Lyman 
Skeen to Blaine and Wilford Skeen of 80 acres, did not 
carry any water and that all of the Lyman Skeen right 
was retained by Lyman Skeen and passed by mesne con-
veyance.s to the defendant. ( R. 84, 85) . 
Finding of fact No. 6 provides in part as follows: 
6. That the 1914 decree refers specifically to the 
deed from Utah Light & Power Company, dated 
in 1903, but does not make any reference to a 
1904 deed on which plaintiff relies. That any 
claims or limitations provided for by the deeds 
could have been raised by plaintiff in the 1914 
litigation. That the rights of the parties in regard 
to this water were settled by the 1914 decree, and 
the parties have abided by that decree at all times 
until about 1937. 
In paragraph 7 of the findings, the court found that 
in 1968, the plaintiff company wrongfully elected to 
withhold half the Lyman Skeen water from the defend-
ants, and the defendants had to lease 24 shares at a cost 
of $7.75 a share in 1969 and $8.50 in 1970. (R. 87). 
The court found that the restriction on the place of 
use of the Lyman Skeen water was " ... not carried for-
ward into the decree ... ";that the water had been used 
on land outside the 147 acre tract described in the Hl03 
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deed since 1922 and that the entire 252 acre feet of water 
produced by the Lyman Skeen right can be beneficially 
used on the defendants' 80 acres of land (R. 87). The 
$33.00 a year assessment as provided in the 1903 deed 
and carried forward to the 1914 decree was a payment in 
full for the water supplied. ( R. 87). 
The court below decreed that the defendants are the 
owners of the Lyman Skeen right as decreed in 1914 
and that the plaintiff is hereby 
" ... ORDERED to deliver the water to said de-
fendants, measured over a weir constructed at or 
near the headgate of that certain lateral upon the 
north branch of defendants' canal system known 
as the Skeen Ditch, in strict accordance with the 
terms of said decree, and the plaintiff is hereby 
enjoined from claiming any right, title, estate or 
interest in said water or any part or portion 
thereof." 
It is further ordered that the Skeen right may be 
used on the 80 acres of land now owned by the def end-
ants " ... and that the annual assessment for said water 
right to be paid by the defendant, is $33.00 per year. 
Judgment for $390.00 for the rental water was awarded 
to the defendants. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
I. The court should have enforced the termination 
provision in the 1904 deed. 
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2. The court eered in finding that the 1914 decree 
entirely superseded the 1903 deed and in failing to en-
force the covenants in that deed. 
3. The court erred in failing to include in the decree 
the restrictions imposed by the 1914 decree, by the 1903 
deed, by the stipulations of defendant as to the source of 
water for the Lyman Skeen right, and by the law. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ENFORCED 
THE TERMINATION PROVISION IN THE 
1904 DEED. 
The 1903 deed from Utah Light & Power Com-
pany, party of the first part, to Lyman Skeen, Exhibit 
H - Appendix p. 27, conveyed to him a water right 
subject to conditions spelled out in detail. These are sum-
marized as follows: 
I. Subject to all prior rights on the basis of one 
second foot flowing continuously for each 150 
acres of land the right to have delivered to Lyman 
Skeen water for use on 110 acres out of 147.37 
acres specifically described "and not otherwise." 
2. The water to be furnished from the "now exist-
ing rights of the Utah Light & Power Company 
in the waters of the 'Veber River, Mill Creek, and 
Four Mile; provided that when the water com-
mences to fail or is low or insufficient in said 
canal for any cause, or in the sources from which 
the water is obtained by the party of the first part 
10 
(Power Company) the grantee shall have his 
proportion and pro-rata of the water with others 
now and hereafter, on the same system." 
3. The second party shall pay to the power com-
pany 30c "for each acre of water to which he is 
entitled ... ," There follows a significant state-
ment to the effect that, "And in default of the 
payment of said sums of money by the party of 
the second part, or its successors and assigns, for 
water used by the party of the second part, or his 
heirs and assigns, on said land or any part of them 
or otherwise said claim for payment of water shall 
at all times constitute a first lien of the party of 
the first part on all of said water and water rights 
hereby conveyed ... " Emphasis and parentheti-
cal statement added. 
The 1904 deed from Lyman Skeen and wife, "par-
ties of the first part" to the Utah Light & Railway Com-
pany, "party of the second part" recites that the parties 
of the first part are the owners of a water right amount-
ing to 307.20-1046.95 of the whole of Salt Creek or 
Four .Mile and are the owners " ... of other interests in 
water rights including canals and water ditches, and 
"\Yhereas the party of the second part is about 
to make an e.i:clumge of said water rights from 
the said Lyman Skeen and his wife Anna Skeen, 
and in u·change therefor to transfer to them cer-
tain water rights in the Utah Light & Railway 
Company's canals and reservoirs, hereinafter re-
f erred to." (Emphasis added.) 
The next paragraph provides that in consideration 
of one rlolJar " ... and also in consideration of a certain 
deed for water and water rights given by the Utah Light 
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& Power Company, predecessor of the Utah Light & 
Railway Company in favor of said Lyman Skeen, which 
said deed is dated the 11th day of February, 1903 ... " 
the first parties grant, bargain, sell and transfer to the 
second party the water rights in Salt Creek and Four 
Mile Creek mentioned in the recitations quoted above. 
The next provision of the deed contains a condition 
subsequent as follows: 
"Provided always, and the above grant, by the 
party of the first part is made for the express con-
sideration that in case the Utah Light & Railway 
Company, or its grantor, the Pioneer Electric 
Power Company, or any of its or their assigns, or 
successors in interest, shall wilfully refuse to 
carry out the agreement to deliver water which is 
contained in the deed, to the party of the first 
part hereto, which deed is dated in the caption 
11th of February, 1903, then the grant of the 
water right in their deed shall cease and deter-
mine, and the parties hereto of the first part shall 
be restored to all the right they had prior to the 
giving of this deed, and no length of time shall 
vary their part of this agreement. 
It is an elementary rule of construction that when 
two deeds are between the same parties related to the 
same subject matter or are parts of the same transaction, 
they will be construed together. 
26 C.J .S., Sec. 91 Deeds, pp. 840-842 
The rule is especially applicable where as in this 
case the 1904 deed specifically refers to the 1903 deed 
by date! 
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The two deeds when construed together clearly con-
stitute an agreement for exchange of water rights. Ly-
man Skeen got the water right described in the 1903 deed 
and the Utah Light & Railway Company got the water 
right described in the 1904 deed. The exchange agree-
ment contained the condition subsequent quoted above 
to the effect that upon the wilful refusal to carry out the 
agreement to deliver water under the 1903 deed " ... 
the grant of the water right in their deed shal,l ce0.8e and 
determine, and the parties hereto of the first part shall 
be restored to all the right they had prior to the giving of 
this deed ... " (Emphasis added.) 
The defendants have pleaded and proved that the 
plaintiff ref used to deliver water to them in 1969 and 
1970. Under the plain language of the 1904 indenture 
the "grant of the water right ceased and determined." It 
is clear that the effect of this provision is automatic. 
There is no requirement of notice and by the plain terms 
of the instrument the defendants' right has ceased and 
their right is restored to 307.20/1046.95 of the water of 
Salt Creek. No contention can successfully be made that 
there was !aches because the indenture provides: ". . . 
and no length of time shall vary their part of this agree-
ment." 
The agreement between the parties was made by the 
exchange of the indentures. The language of the deeds 
is clear and unambiguous, and the provision for termina-
tion of the exchange must be enforced. This disposes of 
the case. 
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The following argument on the other points shall 
not constitute a waiver of Point No. 1. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE 1914 DECREE ENTIRELY SUPERSED. 
ED THE 1903 DEED AND IN FAILIXG TO EN. 
FORCE THE COVENANTS IN THAT DEED. 
The trial court found (Findings Nos. 2, 6, 9 and 10; 
R. 83, 84, 85, 87, 88) in substance and effect that the 
1914 decree superseded the 1903 and 1904 deeds an<l 
decreed that the defendants " ... are now the owners of 
100 per cent of the water right decreed to Lyman Skeen 
... "by the 1914 decree and ordered delivery of water in 
strict accordance with the terms of the decree. The find-
ings and decree are the result of an erroneous construc-
tion of the decree. 
The 1914 decree recites ". . . and the said parties 
having adjusted the differences between them in this 
action, and by stipulation made in open court, adjusted 
a settlement thereof, in which it was agreed that the 
terms of said settlement shall be entered as the decree in 
this action, ... " 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUD~~D 
AND DECREED that in lieu of the prov1s1on 
contained in that certain deed dated February 
nth, 1903, from the Utah Light & Power ~~m­
pany to Lyman Skeen, the pl~intiff, prov1dm~ 
for the delivery to him of certam waters for 1rr1-
gation purposes, that the. said def e~dant as suc-
cessor in interest of the said Utah Light & Power 
Company, beginning with the irrigation season 
14 
for the year 1915, and during each and every year 
thereafter, deliver to the plaintiff, his heirs ad-
ministrators and assigns, five second feet of ~ater 
measured over a weir, to be constructed at or near 
the headgate of that certain lateral upon the north 
branch of defendant's canal system, known as 
the "Skeen Ditch," every fourteen days for a 
period of forty-eight hours, during the months of 
April, May and June, and for second feet every 
fourteen days for a period of forty-eight hours 
during the months of July, August and Septem-
ber, and the said plaintiff, his heirs, administrators 
and assigns, are hereby adjudged and decreed to 
have the right to the use of said five second feet 
of water for a period of forty-eight hours every 
fourteen days during the months of April, May 
and June, and four second feet of water for a 
period of forty-eight hours every fourteen days 
during the months of July, August and Septem-
ber, during the year 1915 and each and every 
year thereafter. 
The next paragraph in the decree relates to failure 
to deliver water by reason of unavoidable accident to the 
canal, the following paragraph relates to the payment of 
$33.00 for the water supplied and furnished and the 
final paragraph relates to the rights of the parties in the 
event of foreclosure of the rights of Lyman Skeen. 
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the 
exchange of water rights is still in effect, the vital ques-
tion arises as to whether the language of the decree, 
" ... that in lieu of the provision contained in that certain 
deed dated February 11, 1903 ... "means that the decree 
was intended to entirely supersede the deed or whether 
15 
the decree was intended to supersede only that provision 
of the deed which is modified by the decree, to-wit, the 
provision relating to the method of delivery of water. 
The language of the decree indicates an intent to 
substitute only the water delivery provision in the decree 
for the water delivery provision in the deed. It will be 
noted that the decree uses the singular of the word "pro-
vision" as it relates to the deed. It says, "It is hereby 
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that in lieu of the pro-
vision contained in that certain deed ... ". The deed con-
tains three pages of provisions but the modification by 
the decree points only at the " ... provision-providing 
for the delivery to him of certain waters ... ". 
We think the decree clearly states that the "in lieu 
language" refers only to the provisions relating to deliv-
ery of water and that except for the modification to give 
the grantee a large useable stream of 4 or 5 second feet 
for irrigation every 14 days instead of a constant flow of 
110/150 of a second foot the parties intended to leave the 
1903 deed in force as written. There is not a word in the 
decree indicating an intent to supersede all provisions of 
the deed. If such was the intent the word provision would 
have been in the plural, and many other important pro-
visions would have been added to the decree. 
Considering the obvious importance to the grantor 
of such conditions as the place of use (which determines 
the point of delivery) the furnishing of water from "now 
existing rights," the penalty of $2.00 per acre for each 
additional acre or part of an acre of water used by the 
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grantee, the priority of the rights of the parties in time 
of drowth, and the imposition of a lien on and the right 
to sell the water right to enforce payment of the annual 
assessment, it seems clear that the parties did not intend 
the decree to be a substitute for the deed. 
If we assume for the sake of argument only that the 
decree is ambiguous, the court may properly consider 
not only all provisions of the judgment but the entire 
record. 
The law is well stated in Corpus Juris Secundum as 
follow~: 
As a general rule, the meaning, effect and legal 
consequences of a judgment must be ascertained 
from its own provisions and language, if possible. 
If, however, the judgment is ambiguous or ob-
scure, or a satisfactory interpretation cannot be 
determined from the judgment itself, the entire 
judgment roll or record may be looked to, ex-
amined, and considered for the purpose of inter-
preting the judgment and determining its opera-
tion and effect. 
49 C. J. S., Sec. 436, pp. 867, 868 
The court may look to the pleadings to determine 
the meaning of an ambiguous judgment. 
Lipsitz v. First National Bank, 293 S.W. 563 
(Texas) 
MUler v. Madigan, 90 Oki. 17, 215 P 742 
The pleadings disclose that the only issue in Case 
No. 4677 (Exhibit L) was as to the delivery of water. 
See the amended complaint filed July 14, 1914 in the 
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folder marked 4677 and the answer filed October 31, 
1914. The file indicates that during the trial judgment 
was entered " ... as per stipulation filed in open court." 
The written stipulation was filed November 10, 1914, a 
copy of which is appended. Appendix p. 33. It states: 
That is lieu of the delivery by the defendant to 
the plaintiff of water from its canal system as 
provided in that certain deed from the plaintiff 
Lyman Skeen and wife to the Utah Light and 
Railway Company, dated February 16th, 1904, 
and that certain deed from the Utah Light and 
Power Company to Lyman Skeen dated Febru-
ary 11th, 1903, by turns and period,.y as in said 
last mentioned deed contained, that beginning 
with the irrigation season for the year 1915 and 
for each and every year thereafter that the said 
defendant will deliver to the plaintiff, his heirs 
and assigns, measured at the headgate of that 
certain lateral upon the north branch of defend-
ant's canal system known as the Skeen Ditch, 
every fourteen days, beginning with the irriga-
tion season of each year, five second feet of water 
to be used upon each delivery for a period of forty 
eight hours during the months of April, May, and 
June, and four second feet of water to be used 
for a period of forty eight hours delivered every 
fourteen days as aforesaid in the months of July, 
August, and September. 
The stipulation ties the two deeds together and 
makes it abundantly clear that it relates only to the water 
delivery provision in the 1903 deed and does not super-
sede either or both deeds. 
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3. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-
CLUDE IX THE DECREE THE RESTRIC-
TIONS 11\IPOSED BY THE 1914 DECREE, HY 
THE 1903 DEED, BY THE STIPULATION OF 
DEFENDANT AS TO THE \VATER SOURCE 
FOR THE LYMAN SKEEN RIGHT AND BY 
LAW. 
The trial court entered a decree which either does 
not settle at all or erroneously decides the issues between 
the parties as framed by the pleadings. The complaint 
and answer raise the following issues : 
A. \Vhether the defendants are obligated to pay 
their share of expenses of operation and maintenance of 
the plaintiff's canal system. 
B. Whether the defendants can irrigate land other 
than that described in the 1903 decree. 
C. \Vhether the defendants' water right has a prior-
ity superior to plaintiff's water right. 
D. Whether all water awarded by the 1903 deed as 
modified by the 1914 decree can be beneficially used on 
defendants' 50 acres of land. 
E. \Vhether the defendants can have the benefit 
without cost to them of diversion, storage and distribu-
tion facilities constructed by the plaintiff since February 
II, 1903. 
These issues will be discussed in the order stated. 
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A. With respect to issue A above, the court found 
that it was the obligation of the defendants to pay" ... 
$33.00 per year" in full for the water supplied. (Find-
ing No. 8; R. 8 7) . The decree provides " ... and the an-
nual assessment for said water right to be paid by the 
defendants to plaintiff is $33.00 per year." (R. 90). It 
will be noted that nowhere in the 1903 deed, the 1914 
decree or the decree from which this appeal is taken does 
there appear a provision that the defendants are not re-
quired to pay their reasonable share of the expense of 
operation and maintenance. The $33.00 per year is for 
the "water" (see finding of fact No. 8) ( R. 86) and "for 
said water right" (see the next to last paragraph of the 
decree) (R. 90). The 1903 deed states that the thirty 
cents per acre is" ... for each acre of water." This docu-
ment is entirely silent as to the expense of operation and 
maintenance. 
Section 73-1-9 provides: 
"73-1-9. Contribution between joint owners of 
ditch or reservoir. - \Vhen two or more f.ersons 
are associated in the use of any dam, cana , reser-
voir ditch, lateral, flume or other means for con-
serv'ing or conveying water for the irrigation of 
land or for other purposes, each of them shall be 
liable to the other for the reasonable expenses of 
maintaining, operating and controlling the sam.e, 
in proportion to the share .in th~ use ~r ownership 
of the water to which he is entitled. 
The rule announced by the Supreme Court of Utah 
in Gunnison-Fayette Canal, Company v. Roberts, 12 
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Utah 2d 153, 364 P2d 103 regarding obligations of joint 
users of a canal is as follows: 
"In th~ 3:bsence of an enforceable agreement be-
tween J?mt. users of a canal specifying the rights 
and obhgabons of the parties with respect to the 
~ayment of the canal's expenses, the statute (sec-
bon 73-1-9, U.C.A. 1953) is controlling." 364 
P2d 105 
There being no agreement as to operation and main-
tenance expenses the rule in the GunnisonFayette Canal 
Co., supra, is applicable and the defendants are obligated 
to pay a fair proportion of such expenses pursuant to 
Section 73-1-9 U.C.A. 1953. 
B. The Court erred in failing to limit the use of the 
Lyman Skeen water right to the 147 acres of land de-
scribed in the 1903 deed. The court found (Finding No. 
9; R. 87) that this restriction was not carried into the 
decree. The plaintiff contends, and has argued above, 
that the decree wa~ in lieu of only one provision in the 
1903 deed-that relating to the delivery of water. That 
argument, if sound, disposes of this point. However, 
there is another reason why the finding and decree are 
erroneous as to this issue. Once a water right becomes 
appurtenant to land, it cannot be changed to other land 
without filing an application with the State Engineer. 
The law in effect in 1922 when Lyman Skeen con-
veyed land to his sons, Blaine and Wilford and used it on 
other land, is found in Section 8, Chapter 67, Laws of 
Utah, 1919 which provides: 
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Any person, corporation or association, entitled 
to the use of water, may change the place of diver-
sion or place of use and may use the water for 
other purposes than those for which it was orig-
inally appropriated, but no such change shall lie 
made, if it impairs any vested right, without just 
compensation; no change of point of diversion, 
place or purpose of use shall be made except on 
the approval of an application of the owner by the 
State Engineer. 
The record does not disclose any application for 
change of place of use of the Lyman Skeen right from 
the land described in the 1903 deed. 
The record also shows that the conveyances to 
Blaine and Wilford reserved no water right and as a 
matter of law the water right appurtenant to some 67 
acres of land described in the 1903 deed was transferred 
away by Lyman Skeen and never reconveyed. See Laws 
of Utah, 1919, Chapter 67, Section 15 (now 73-1-11 
U.C.A., 1953). 
C. The court made no finding nor decree as to the 
issue as to the relative priorities of the plaintiff's and de-
fendants' water rights raised by the pleadings. See para-
graph 5 of the complaint ( R. 2) and paragraph 5 of the 
answer (R. 14). The 1903 deed expressly states that the 
Lyman Skeen right is, "subject to all prior rights ... " 
(R. 4). The 1914 decree is silent on the subject. Again, 
this is an uncertainty of vital importance to the litigants 
and not resolved by the decree. This was error. 
D. The Lyman Skeen right was made appurtenant 
by contract to 110 acres of land within a tract of 147 
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acres specifically described. The defendants now claim, 
and the trial court found, that the defendants were en-
titled to use this water on 80 acres, (of which ao are out-
side of the 147 acre tract) . There are only 50 acres on 
which the water can legally be used. See area colored in 
pink of the map, Exhibit C. 
Laws of Utah, 1919 Chapter 67, Section 3 provides: 
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and 
the limit of all rights to the use of water in this 
State." (Now Section 73-1-3) 
The statutory provision quoted above modified 
existing case law in the western states and is one of the 
basic principles of the water law. 
l \Viel on \Vater Rights Section 478 
Hutchins Selected Problems of \Vater Law in 
the \Vest pp. 3U-319. 
"Beneficial use is not what is actually consumed, 
but what is reasonably necessary for the purpose 
to which the water is devoted, and an excessive 
diversion of water for any purpose cannot be re-
garded as a diversion for beneficial use, in so far 
as it is in excess of any reasonable requirement 
for that purpose." 
California P and A Co. t'. ftladero Canal~ Irr. 
Co. 167 Cal. 78, 138 P 718. 
In Mt. Olivet C. Ass'n. t•. Salt Lake Cit,11, 65 Utah 
193, 235 P 876, the court said: 
"The extent of the rights of an appropriator is 
limited to his reasonable necessities. The diver-
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sion and use of water creates a legal right only to 
the quantity necessary for the use." 
See also: Hardy v. Beaver County Irr. Co., 65 
Utah 28, 234 P 524; Riordan v. Westwood, 115 
Utah 215, 203 P2d 922; In re \Vater Rights of 
Escalante 10 Utah 2d 77, 348 P2d 679. 
In the case before this court the only expert evi-
dence before the court was that the diversion by the de-
fendants of 5 second feet for 48 hours every two weeks 
for the first three months of the irrigation season reduced 
to 4 second feet for the last three months of the season 
would deliver to the 50 acres of land owned by the de-
fendants, 102 acre feet annually more than the quantity 
reasonably required. This results from the claim of the 
defendant that he is entitled to divert for use of 50 acres 
the water reasonably required for 110 acres as stated in 
the 1903 deed. This claim is not supported by, but is con-
trary to the written contract of the parties, the evidence 
and the basic law. 
E. The question as to whether the defendants are 
entitled to the benefit of water made available by the 
pumping plant, storage and diversion dam, and .Echo 
Reservoir water, all acquired and purchased since 1903 
was in issue. See paragraph 5 of the complaint ( R. 2). 
The 1903 deed restricted the Lyman Skeen right to 
" ... water to be furnished from the now existing rights 
of the Utah Light & Power Company in the waters of 
Weber River, Mill Creek and Four Mile." ( R. 5). The 
1914 decree limited the Lyman Skeen right to water 
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" ... in the natural sources of supply (exclusive of its 
pwnping plant)." 
Counsel for the defendants stipulated in open court 
with respect to the source: 
.MR. CLYDE: There is no issue on that. \Ve 
don't deny that. I mean we are entitled to the four 
and five ·feet exactly as the deed says, and pur-
chases they have made from Echo or improve-
ments they have made in their pumping system to 
get other or different waters we have no interest. 
\Vith all of the foregoing before the court, a find-
ings and decree were made by the trial court without 
mention of this important restriction of the contract 
water right. This error def ea ts the purpose of the litiga-
tion and deprives the plaintiff of its right to have all 
material issues determined. 
It is well settled that the failure of the trial court to 
make findings of fact on all material issues is reversible 
error where it is prejudicial. Piper v. Eakle, 78 Utah 
342, 2 P2d 909; Pike v. Clar/..·, 95 Ctah 235, 75 P2d 
1010; West v. Standard Fu.el Co., 81 Ctah 300, 17 P2d 
292; Gaddis Im·. Co. v. illorrison, 3 Ctah 2d 43, 278 
P2d 284; Simper v. Broten, 74 Ctah 178, 278 P 529. 
CONCLCSIOX 
The trial court refused to enforce the condition sub-
sequent in the 1904 deed, which automatically terminat-
ed, because of the rcf usal of the plaintiff to deliver water 
in H>6U and 1970, the exchange of water rights e\·idenced 
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by the 1903 and 1904 deeds. The enforcement of the 
termination of the exchange would make the other issues 
tried entirely moot and would restore the parties to the 
position they were in before the deeds were exchanged. 
Assuming for the sake of argument only that the 
exchange has not been terminated the trial court erred 
in holding that the 1914 decree entirely superseded the 
1903 deed, that the defendants can irrigate land other 
than that described in the 1903 deed, and that all water 
made available by the Lyman Skeen right can be bene-
ficially used on the defendants' 50 acres of land that are 
within the deed description. The court further erred in 
failing to make findings and a decree on the issues of 
priority, the obligation to pay expenses of operation and 
maintenance in addition to the 30 cents per acre for the 
water, and the restriction of the defendants' water source 
to water rights in existence in 1903. 
The decree should be reversed and the trial court 
should be directed to make and enter a decree restoring 
to the parties the water rights as they existed prior to the 
exchange of deeds. If such relief is not granted, the 
present decree should be modified to enforce the pro-
visions of the 1903 deed as changed by the 1914 decree, 
and to grant to the plaintiff the equitable relief men-
tioned above. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
SKEEN AND SKEEN 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
THIS INDENTURE, made this 11th day of 
February, 1903, between the C:T All LIGHT AND 
POWER CO~lf PAXY, a corporation of the State of 
Utah, of the first part, and LY1lf AN SKEEN of 
Plain City, \Veber County, State of Utah, of the second 
part, \VITNESSETH: That, 
\VHEREAS, the party of the first part is the 
owner of a canal and canal system that extends from 
a certain point on the \Veber River, in and through the 
Precincts of )larriott, Slaterville, Plain City, and 
Warren, and have built and are operating said canal 
system for irrigation of the lands of \Varren Precinct 
and vicinity; and 
\VHEREAS, said party of the second part agrees 
to comply with certain requirements, and has executed 
and delivered to the party of the first part a good and 
sufficient deed to certain water ways and water rights; 
NO\V, THEREFORE, the party of the first part, 
in consideration of the sum of one dollar ( .'f;J .UO) to it in 
hand paid by the said party of the second part, the 
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and in con-
sideration of the agreements hy the party of the second 
part to and in fa,·or of the party of the first part here-
inafter contained, does by these presents hereby promise 
and agree, subject to the conditions hereinafter named, 
to furnish and deliver to said party of the second part, 
his heirs and assigns fore,·er, limited as hereinafter 
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desi~~ted during the season of each and every year, 
begmnmg April 15th, and ending October 15th except 
~hen prevented by unusual storms, fioods, droughts, 
disasters and other causes over which it has no control 
and, ' 
(I) Subject to all prior rights to the use of water 
in the several streams and sources from which said party 
of the first part now or may hereafter obtain its water 
supply, a water right for said period for IIO acres of 
land, which said water right, except as hereinafter 
modified, is determined upon the basis of one cubic 
foot per second, flowing continuously, for each one 
hundred and fifty acres of land. The water to be fur-
nished to said party of the second part is to be delivered 
to him at from and on the grade of the nearest canal 
owned by said party of the first part, and the said water 
so delivered to said party of the second part must be 
taken under the direction of the party of the first part, 
and under such reasonable regulations as to place, and 
kind of head gates to be placed in the canal, which are 
to be furnished by the party of the first part, and also 
as to time, turns, and periods the water is to be used, 
consistent with the rights of the other water takers from 
said system, and never to exceed the amount aforesaid 
in the aggregate; and said water so furnished shall be 
used by said party of the second part, his heirs and 
assigns, upon the following described land, and not 
otherwise, to-wit: 
The east 1/2 of the northwest l)i of Section 31, in 
Township Seven ( 7) north, of Range Two ( 2) West, 
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Salt Lake Meridian U.S. Survey; also beginning at 
the centre of said Section Thirty-one ( 31), thence 
South 0 deg. 45 min. west 820 feet, to centre of creek 
thence Southerly along creek to centre of road, thence 
north 89 deg. 55 min. west along centre of road 2107.5 
feet, thence north 1 deg. 30 min. west 1570 feet to north 
line of said IJI Section, thence South 88 deg. 05 min. 
east 1777.25 feet to place of beginning, in all 147.37 
acres, more or less. 
( 2) Said water to be furnished from the now exist-
ing rights of the Utah Light & Power Company in the 
waters of Weber River, Mill Creek and Four Mile; 
Provided, that when the water commences to fail, 
or is low, or insufficient in said canal for any cause, or 
in the sources from which the water is obtained by the 
party of the first part, the grantee shall have his pro-
portion and pro-rata of the water with others now and 
hereafter, on the same system. 
The said party of the second part, his heirs and 
assigns, shall pay on or before the first day of November 
in each year to said party of the first part, its successors 
and assigns, the sum of Thirty Cents per acre, lawful 
money of the United States, for each acre of water to 
which he is entitled, but in no case shall he be entitled 
to exceeding the amount of water hereby promised to 
be furnished to said party of the second part. And in 
case it shall be found at any time during or at the end 
of the season that the party of the second part has used 
or is using more water than he is entitled to, or has 
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irrigated more acres of ground than called for in liis 
deed, said party of the first part shall have the right 
to collect the sum of $2.00 per acre for each additional 
acre or part of an acre of water so used. And in default 
of the payment of said sums of money by the party 
of the second part to the party of the first part, or its 
successors or assigns, for water used by the party of 
the second part, or his heirs or assigns, on said lands 
or any part of them, or otherwise, said claims for pay-
ment of water shall at all times be and constitute a first 
lien in favor of the party of the first part on all of said 
water and water rights hereby conveyed or intended to 
be conveyed; and the party of the first part shall have 
the power, and it shall be its right to sell said water 
right or such part thereof as may be sufficient for the 
payment of said claim or claims after giving to the 
party of the second part thirty days' notice of the time, 
terms and conditions of said sale, and said company, 
the party of the first part, may be a purchaser at said 
sale. 
Provided, further, that the said party of the second 
part shall have the right to redeem his water or water 
right, so summarily sold within one year of the date 
of said sale, and by paying the amount for which the 
same was sold, together with the costs of said sale, and 
interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said party of the 
first part has hereunto caused its name and seal to be 
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affixed by its President and Secretary this I I th day 
of February, A.D. 1903. 
UTAH LIGHT AXD PO\\'EH CO)lPANY, 
By .Jos. F. Smith President 
R. S. Campbell Secretary 
(Duly acknowledged) 
THIS IXDEXTCHE made the H>th day of 
February, 1904, between Lyman Skeen and his wife 
Anna Skeen, of Plain City, \\' eber County, Ctah, par-
ties of the first part, and the l •tah Light & Railway 
Company, a corporation of the State of t•tah, party 
of the second part, \\' ITX ESSETll: 
That whereas the parties of the first part have 
been up to this date, and are now the owner of the water 
right amounting to 307.~0-JO.j.6.95 of the whole of 
Salt Creek, or Four :\Iile, a stream of water that takes 
its rise south of Plain City, in the County of \Veber 
and State of Ctah. and said parties of the first part 
are the owner of other interest in water rights, includ-
ing canals and water ditches. and. 
\Vhereas the party of the second part is about to 
make an exchange of said water rights from the said 
Lyman Skeen and his wife Anna Skeen, and in exchange 
therefor to transfer to them certain water rights in 
the etah Light & Railway Company's canals and res-
erroirs, hereinafter ref erred to,-
X ow, therefore, the parties of the first part, in 
consideration of the premises and the sum of one dollar 
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to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby 
acknowledged, and also in consideration of a certain 
deed for water and water rights given by the Utah 
Light & Power Company, predecessor of the Utah 
Light & Railway Company, in favor of said Lyman 
Skeen, which said deed is dated the 11th day of Feb-
ruary, 1903, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and transfer 
to the party of the second part, its successors and 
assigns forever all their right, of, in and to the water 
and canal system of the said Salt Creek and Four Mile 
streams, and all right of, in and to the Salt Creek irri-
gation, being 307.20 dollars, in what is known as Salt 
Creek Irrigation Company, the said amount 307.20-
1046.95 of the whole of said Salt Creek Irrigation 
Company, an unincorporated association, together with 
and including all the canals, ditches, reservoir and high-
water rights owned by the parties; provided, that this 
conveyance shall not be deemed to include the private 
or lateral ditches owned by the parties of the first part 
connected with the main canal, or otherwise. 
Provided always, and the above grant, by the party 
of the first part is made for the express consideration 
that in case the Utah Light & Railway Company, or 
its grantor, the Pioneer Electric Power Company, or 
any of its or their assigns, or successors in interest, shall 
wilfully refuse to carry out the agreement to deliver 
water which is contained in the deed, to the party of the 
first part hereto, which deed is dated in the caption 11th 
of February, 1903, then the grant of the water right 
in their deed shall cease and determine, and the parties 
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hereto of the first part shall be restored to all the right 
they had prior to the giving of this deed, and no length 
of time shall vary their part of this agreement. 
The party of the second part at its expense is to 
take all necessary steps to protect and maintain the 
water hereby conveyed from depletion or from being 
taken from outside parties; and the grantor in case of 
suit or suits at law to protect said right shall at his 
expense furnish the witnesses and e,·idence to establish 
and protect the right hereby conveyed. 
Provided, the party of the first part may limit the 
amount of water he shall use during any one season by 
giving written notice to the Company of the amount 
of water he desires to take, which notice shall be served 
upon the Company not later than ~lay 1st of each year, 
in the fault of such notice the grantee shall be deemed 
to have taken his full amount to which he is entitled. 
Witness 
Lyman Skeen 
Anna Skeen 
J.D. Skeen 
(Duly acknowledged) 
(Title of the Court & Ca use) 
STIPl:LATION 
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between 
the parties hereto that a judgment and decree shall be 
entered in this cause by consent as follows: 
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That in lieu of the delivery by the defendant to 
~e plaintiff of water from its canal system as provided 
m that certain deed from the plaintiff Lyman Skeen 
and wife to the Ctah Light and Railway Company, 
dated February 16th, 1904, and that certain deed from 
the Utah Light and Power Company to Lyman Skeen 
dated February 11th, 190:3, by turns and periods as in 
said last mentioned deed contained, that beginning with 
the irrigation season for the year 1915 and for each 
and every year thereafter that the said defendant will 
deliver to the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, measured 
at the headgate of that certain lateral upon the north 
branch of defendant's canal system known as the Skeen 
Ditch, every fourteen days, beginning with the irriga-
tion season of each year, five second feet of water to be 
used upon each delivery for a period of forty eight 
hours during the months of April, .1\lay, and June, and 
four second feet of water to be used for a period of 
forty eight hours delivered every fourteen days as afore-
said in the months of July, August and September. 
Provided that the said defendant shall not be held to 
make delivery if unable to do so by reason of any un· 
avoidable accident to its canal system during the period 
required for its repair, or in case that there shall not 
be a sufficient quantity at the natural sources of supply, 
exclusive of its said pumping plant, of said canal system 
to make delivery of the full amounts herein provided 
for in which case it shall he required to deliver only 
su~h quantity as it may be able to divert and deliver 
from it said natural sources of supply. 
34 
It is further agreed that the said plaintiff shall 
pay to the said defendant on or before the 1st day of 
November of each year the sum of thirty three dollars 
in full for the water supplied and furnished as afore-
said; provided however that the said defendant shall 
not be required thereafter to make delivery as herein· 
before provided until such payment shall have been 
made with legal interest thereon. 
It is further stipulated that each party shall pa,-
his own costs. 
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